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THE HUMAN RIGHTS COSTS OF CHINA’S ARMS SALES 
TO SUDAN—A VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
ON TWO FRONTS 
Stephanie L. Kotecki† 
Abstract: As an emerging world power, China has a crucial need for oil to meet 
its growing fuel consumption.  It has invested heavily in Sudan, a country with extensive 
and productive oil reserves.  However, this partnership has an ugly side.  Sudanese militia 
groups, as well as government troops, have been committing gross human rights 
violations against residents of the Darfur region.  Meanwhile, Chinese arms 
manufacturers have continued to export weapons and military equipment to Sudan, with 
the full knowledge of the Chinese government.  Many of the weapons used to raid 
villages in Darfur were manufactured in China. 
International norms have evolved to regulate the global arms trade.  State usage of 
these norms and the general belief in their force both support the argument that these 
norms now qualify as customary international law.  These potentially enforceable norms 
require that arms-trading nations implement and enforce strict export regulations on 
licenses for arms shipments, in order to keep those shipments from going to unstable 
destinations where there is a high risk that they will be used to perpetuate conflict or 
commit human rights abuses.  China’s arms trade to Sudan violates this standard and is 
arguably a violation of international law.  China is also violating international law by 
aiding and assisting the government of Sudan in the commission of crimes against 
humanity.  Sudan is committing human rights abuses against civilians in Darfur, which is 
an internationally wrongful act, and China is complicit by indiscriminately providing the 
arms that are used in the attacks.  China should make the necessary changes to its arms 
export practices and regulations to align them with international law, and should 
immediately halt further arms shipments to Sudan. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Armed men on horses, camels and vehicles came with 
Sudanese government soldiers and surrounded the village at 
midday.  Two hours later, one . . . plane and two helicopters 
flew over the village and shot rockets.  The attackers came into 
the houses and shot my mother and grandfather.  The attack 
lasted for two hours and everything was burnt down in the 
village.  Thirty-five people were killed during the attack—five 
women, 17 children and 13 men—and they were not buried.1 
                                           
†
 The author would like to thank Professor Joel Ngugi for his invaluable assistance and the Journal 
editorial staff for all their hard work and helpful insights. 
1
 Amnesty Int’l, Sudan: Arming the Perpetrators of Grave Abuses in Darfur, AI Index AFR 
54/139/2004, Nov. 16, 2004, at 12, available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engafr541392004 
[hereinafter Arming Sudan]. 
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This story, reported by Darfur resident Adam Roum, whose village was 
attacked in June 2003, is just one example of the human rights violations 
that have occurred systematically in the Darfur region of Sudan in recent 
years.2  Attacks often come from the sky, as Sudanese military helicopters 
drop bombs onto villages and farms.3  The aerial bombings frequently occur 
before or in conjunction with a ground attack by armed militia in all-terrain 
vehicles.4  Members of the state-controlled, heavily armed Janjaweed militia 
carry out these ground attacks.5  A study by the World Health Organization 
found that almost 27,000 violent deaths occurred in the Darfur region in 
2004 (over 2000 per month).6 
Since the 1990s, China has been one of the major global suppliers of 
military equipment and arms to Sudan.7  Documented reports note the sale of 
fifty Chinese-manufactured Z-6 helicopters to the Sudanese government, as 
well as the provision of technical repair services by Harbin Dongan Engine, 
a Chinese company.8  The small arms exported from China come in the form 
of rifles, shotguns, and handguns, according to United Nations (“UN”) 
Comtrade data.9  Implicated Chinese weapons manufacturers include 
Changhe Aircraft Industries and Dongfeng Aeolus.10 
China’s interest in Sudan is not confined to the arms trade.  China’s 
need for oil has grown rapidly in recent years, and it has invested in African 
oil exploration to meet that need.11  Sudan is a primary focus of Chinese oil 
development, and China is far ahead of other nations in oil contracts there.12  
By 2005, China was buying fifty to sixty percent of Sudan’s oil exports, 
                                           
2
 See The Int’l Comm’n of Inquiry on Darfur, Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on 
Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General, 3, U.N. Doc. S/2005/60 (Jan. 25, 2005), available at 
http://www.un.org/News/dh/sudan/com_inq_darfur.pdf [hereinafter Report of the ICI on Darfur]. 
3
 Arming Sudan, supra note 1, at 10 (citing Oct. 2004 monthly briefing to the U.N. Security Council 
by U.N. Special Representative on Sudan Jan Pronk); see also Amnesty Int’l, People’s Republic of China: 
Sustaining Conflict and Human Rights Abuses: The Flow of Arms Continues, AI Index ASA 17/030/2006, 
June 11, 2006, at 18, available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engasa170302006 [hereinafter 
Sustaining Conflict] (describing several specific instances of air attack). 
4
  Arming Sudan, supra note 1, at 10. 
5
 Report of the ICI on Darfur, supra note 2, at 36. 
6
  GRADUATE INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, SMALL ARMS SURVEY 2005: WEAPONS AT 
WAR 236-37 box 9.2 (2005) [hereinafter Small Arms Survey 2005]. 
7
 Arming Sudan, supra note 1, at 17. 
8
  Id. (citing NIF and SPLA Carve Up Sudan, JANE’S INTELLIGENCE REVIEW, Jan. 7, 1998; 
AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL, available at www.aviationnow.com/content/ 
publication/awst/2001outlook/aw347.htm (link provided by Amnesty International requires member login 
and password for online access.)). 
9
 Arming Sudan, supra note 1, at 30. 
10
  Sustaining Conflict, supra note 3, at 18-19.  
11
  China-Africa Trade Jumps by 39 Percent, BBC NEWS, Dec. 29, 2006, http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/ 
mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4587374.stm. 
12
  Id. 
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fulfilling seven percent of its own consumption needs.13  China has invested 
over eight billion dollars in joint exploration contracts in Sudan.14  As 
recently as July 2007, a major Chinese oil company reached an agreement 
allowing it to search for oil off the coast of Sudan and to own a stake in 
production for the next twenty years.15  The state-owned China National 
Offshore Oil Corporation (“CNOOC”) is a major presence with 10,000 
Chinese workers in the country.16 
China’s financial interests in the country may contribute to its tolerant 
stance regarding Sudan’s human rights record in Darfur.17  China began 
investing in Sudan’s oil fields around the same time that other nations were 
breaking off diplomatic ties with the country due to its human rights 
abuses.18  China has been a consistent ally to Sudan in the international 
debate over the situation in Darfur.19  Human Rights Watch reports that 
China provided financial and military support to the Sudanese government 
during periods of ethnic cleansing in Darfur.20  China also used its position 
on the Security Council to vigorously oppose UN-proposed sanctions against 
Khartoum.21 
The situation in Darfur highlights the problem of the international 
arms trade to conflict regions.  Despite global awareness of the humanitarian 
crisis in Darfur, China continues to provide military equipment to the 
government of Sudan.22  The weapons sent from China to Sudan do not 
appear to travel through illicit channels, because China reports these 
shipments to the UN Comtrade.23  If the Chinese government gave export 
licenses to these shipments, it effectively provided its stamp of approval.  
                                           
13
  Africa: China’s Great Leap Into the Continent, IRINNEWS.ORG, Mar. 23, 2006, 
http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=58530 [hereinafter China’s Great Leap].  
14
  Id. 
15
  China to Search for Oil in Sudan, BBC NEWS, July 2, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ 
business/6261418.stm. 
16
  China’s Great Leap, supra note 13, at 2. 
17
  It is interesting to note that China’s investment in Sudan’s oil resources has provided the 
government with a significant cash flow, enabling Sudan to use its new oil wealth to purchase expensive 
military equipment from Chinese manufacturers.  Arming Sudan, supra note 1, at 39-40. 
18
  See generally China’s Great Leap, supra note 13.  
19
  Michael Vatikiotis, Oil Lust in the Face of Genocide, FAR E. ECON. REV., Oct. 7, 2004, Vol. 167, 
Iss. 40, at 20. 
20
  China’s Great Leap, supra note 13, at 2. 
21
  Vatikiotis, supra note 19. 
22
  China’s shipment of military equipment to Sudan is documented as early as 1996.  See Arming 
Sudan, supra note 1, at 17.  In 2003, China was still Sudan’s major arms supplier, according to UN 
Comtrade data.  See GRADUATE INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, SMALL ARMS SURVEY 2006: 
UNFINISHED BUSINESS 77 table 3.2 (2006).  See also China, Russia Deny Weapons Breach, BBC NEWS, 
May 8, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6632959.stm (reporting claims that photographic evidence 
shows that China has continued since 2005 to ship arms to Sudan, which are then sent to Darfur). 
23
  See Arming Sudan, supra note 1, at 30 n.86. 
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Although the human rights abuses taking place in Sudan are well-known in 
the international community,24 the instability and conflict within the country 
do not appear to prevent Chinese export regulators from approving license 
applications for arms shipments to that area.  Thus, the “legitimate” trade in 
arms between the two countries is serving to prolong and worsen the 
humanitarian crisis in Darfur. 
Despite the trade benefits of China’s relationship with Sudan, China 
cannot afford to continue turning a blind eye to the crisis in Darfur.  China’s 
arms trade to Sudan violates international law on two levels:  1) As a 
primary actor, China fails to adequately regulate arms exports to a conflict 
region, and 2) as a secondary actor, it is aiding and assisting the government 
of Sudan in the commission of crimes against humanity.  China’s actions are 
placing the country at risk of international legal sanction.  To avoid this 
possibility, China should tighten its export license controls so that shipments 
of small arms and conventional weapons to Sudan are not authorized 
indiscriminately.  China’s export regulations are too vague, relying heavily 
on the discretion of those who are granting licenses, and must be more 
strictly implemented. 
Part II of this Comment describes the components that are legally 
required for formation and recognition of a norm as customary international 
law.  Part III argues that the international norm requiring export controls on 
arms shipments to conflict areas has attained the status of binding customary 
international law.  Part IV demonstrates that China is violating this 
customary norm by inadequately controlling the export of arms from its 
manufacturers to conflict regions.  Part V describes how the Articles of State 
Responsibility attribute responsibility for internationally wrongful acts to 
states that commit or assist in those acts.  Part VI proposes that Sudan is 
committing internationally wrongful acts in Darfur, that China is providing 
assistance to Sudan in the form of arms and equipment, and that both nations 
are violating the Draft Articles of State Responsibility.  Part VII recommends 
legislation and policy changes that would improve China’s adherence to 
international law. 
II. INTERNATIONAL NORMS THAT SATISFY THE LEGAL REQUIREMENTS FOR 
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW HAVE BINDING FORCE 
China is not party to any binding treaties that regulate the trade in 
small arms and military equipment of the type that is being exported to 
                                           
24
 In 2004, UN member states discussed imposing sanctions on Sudan in response to the human 
rights crisis.  See Vatikiotis, supra note 19. 
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Sudan.25  However, the “hard law” found in treaties and multilateral 
agreements26 is not the only source of international legal authority.  Custom, 
general norms, and less-than-binding agreements, sometimes called “soft 
law,” can also have legal force.27  This occurs when the international usage 
of the norms is adequately general and widespread to meet the two 
requirements of a formal definition of customary international law:  usage 
and belief that the norm is binding.28 
Evidence of customary international law can be found in official 
statements and actions,29 UN resolutions,30 and multilateral agreements,31 
even those that are not binding on all states.32  A norm that is recognized as 
customary international law is binding and can be enforced in court.33 
A. Legal Norms Must Be Supported by States’ General Usage and Opinio 
Juris to Qualify as Customary International Law 
Customary international law consists of a general practice among 
states that has been accepted as law.34  This definition can be divided into 
two components:  state usage, or patterns and practices of behavior, and 
opinio juris, the belief or expectation that the norm is legally binding.35 
                                           
25
  China is signatory to arms control treaties that regulate biological, chemical, and weapons of mass 
destruction (“WMD”) shipments, but does not participate in any treaties that cover small arms and 
conventional weapons.  See Ministry of Foreign Affairs, List of Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-
Proliferation Treaties that China has Joined, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/jks/tyylb/t141338.htm 
(last visited May 24, 2007). 
26
  See Richard L. Williamson, Jr., Is International Law Relevant to Arms Control?: Hard Law, Soft 
Law, and Non-Law in Multilateral Arms Control: Some Compliance Hypotheses, 4 CHI. J. INT’L L. 59, 63 
(2003). 
27
  See id. 
28
  Jordan J. Paust, The Complex Nature, Sources and Evidences of Customary Human Rights, 25 GA. 
J. INT’L & COMP. L. 147, 148 (1995/1996). 
29
  MARK E. VILLIGER, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TREATIES: A MANUAL ON THE 
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERRELATION OF SOURCES 50 (2d ed. 1997). 
30
  Richard B. Lillich, The Growing Importance of Customary International Human Rights Law, 25 
GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 8-9 (1995/1996). 
31
  Id.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §102(3) 
(1987). 
32
  Melissa Robbins, Powerful States, Customary Law and the Erosion of Human Rights Through 
Regional Enforcement, 35 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 275, 292-93 (2005). 
33
  Lillich, supra note 30, at 17-18. 
34
  Statute of the Int’l Court of Justice, art. 38(1)(b), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993. 
35
 MICHAEL BYERS, CUSTOM, POWER AND THE POWER OF RULES: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND 
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 130 (1999). 
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1. General State Practice of a Norm Satisfies the Usage Requirement 
State practice consists of any official statement, action, or omission36 
made by a state in its international legal relations.37  This can include 
diplomatic correspondence, legislation, or ratification of an international 
agreement.38  Concrete actions taken by a state are weighed most heavily as 
evidence of state practice,39 but statements also qualify as evidence of 
practice.40  These can be verbal statements, such as reports to international 
organizations, or written text, such as press releases or policy statements.41 
Usage or practice by only one state is not sufficient to meet the 
requirements of customary international law.42  Practice among states must 
be “uniform, extensive, and representative in character.”43  A long history of 
general practice is not required.44  As long as the practice is consistent, it can 
develop over a short period of time.45 
Although the practice of a norm must be representative, it does not 
have to be universal.46  If it includes the states “whose interests are specially 
affected,” the norm is presumably representative.47  An example of a 
situation where this would apply is a norm affecting states with nuclear 
capability.48  Although the norm technically applies to all states, including 
those who have not yet developed nuclear capability, the practices of the 
states that do have the capability are the most important in showing that a 
norm exists. 
In addition, all affected states do not have to consent to the norm.  
Even dissenting states can be bound by customary law,49 the only exception 
being if a state “persistently and openly” dissents from the norm as it 
                                           
36
  INT’L LAW ASS’N COMMITTEE ON THE FORMATION OF RULES OF CUSTOMARY (GENERAL) INT’L 
LAW, STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE TO THE FORMATION OF GENERAL CUSTOMARY 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, arts. 4, 6 (2000), available at http://www.ila-hq.org/pdf/CustomaryLaw.pdf 
[hereinafter ILA STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES]. 
37
  Id. commentary to art. 1(b)(1). 
38
 The Int’l Law Comm’n, Report of the International Law Commission on its Second Session, 5 
June to 29 July 1950, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth Session, Supplement No. 12, 368, 
370-72, U.N. Doc. A/1316 (1950). 
39
  ILA STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES, supra note 36, commentary to art. 3. 
40
  Id. art. 4. 
41
  Id. commentary to art. 4. 
42
  See id. art. 12(i). 
43
  Id. 
44
  IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 7 (6th ed. 2003). 
45
  North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den., F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 42 (Feb. 20). 
46
  ILA STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES, supra note 36, art. 14(i). 
47
  See North Sea Continental Shelf, 1969 I.C.J. at 43. 
48
  VILLIGER, supra note 29 at 31. 
49
  Paust, supra note 28, at 152. 
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develops.50  In the same vein, treaties and international agreements can have 
the force of customary law, even for countries that are not party to them, 
when the principles of the treaty have general application and are widely 
accepted.51 
2. A General Belief in the Binding Nature of a Norm Satisfies the Opinio 
Juris Requirement 
Opinio juris is a legal term for the subjective requirement of legal 
belief in a customary international law.52  The Statute of the International 
Court of Justice (“ICJ”) states that customary norms must be practices that 
are “accepted as law.”53  A norm is authoritative if states believe that it 
creates a legal obligation and that violation of the norm would result in 
sanction.54  The belief or legal expectation of one state is not determinative; 
rather, the binding nature of the custom comes from the shared norms and 
expectations of the international community of states.55 
Evidence of a state’s belief in the legality of the custom can be found 
in official statements about the binding nature of a rule, or in UN votes and 
official statements.56  Evidence of opinio juris can also be inferred from 
consistent state action or material practice.57 
The International Law Association’s (“ILA”) Statement of Principles 
Applicable to the Formation of General Customary International Law 
claims, contrary to traditional doctrine, that belief is not necessary for the 
formation of the law.58  Thus, the belief prong of customary international law 
is arguably the less crucial one, because customary law can form as a result 
of consistent state practice even if states do not explicitly express a belief in 
the binding nature of the norm.59  However, a showing of legal belief 
strengthens the argument that a customary international norm exists because 
                                           
50
  ILA STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES, supra note 36, art. 15. 
51
  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §102(3). 
52
  Andrew T. Guzman, Saving Customary International Law, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 115, 141 (2005).  
53
  Statute of the Int’l Court of Justice, art. 38(1)(b), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993 
54
  VILLIGER, supra note 29, at 48. 
55
 Paust, supra note 28, at 151. 
56
  VILLIGER, supra note 29 at 51. 
57
  Guzman, supra note 52, at 149. 
58
  ILA STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES, supra note 36, art. 16. 
59
  There are exceptions in certain circumstances where the conduct of the state does not by nature 
give rise to an expectation of legal authority.  This exception includes actions that are outside the realm of a 
state’s international legal relations or those that are generally understood to be non-binding in nature.  See 
id. art. 17. 
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general belief in a norm’s legal obligation qualifies as proof of customary 
law.60 
B. The ICJ’s Definition of Customary International Law Includes New 
Sources of Evidence for State Practice and Belief, Such as 
International Agreements and Policy Declarations 
The ICJ Statute is the authoritative source for the definition of 
customary international law, but it does not specifically define the elements 
of usage and legal belief.  The precise components of customary 
international law are subject to much debate,61 but scholars of international 
law seem to agree that the definition of these components is a developing 
concept.62  Much of the debate centers on the types of evidence that are 
sufficient to show that a law has formed.63  Traditionally, a determination of 
customary international law relied primarily on state action as evidence of a 
general custom.64  The modern concept of the doctrine is broader, and 
includes official declarations, policy statements, resolutions, and treaties as 
valid sources of evidence.65 
Opinions from the ICJ shed light on this point.  In a seminal early ICJ 
holding that addressed customary international law, the Court focused 
primarily on state actions as proof of a state’s belief in the binding nature of 
a custom.66  However, the Court’s analysis in modern cases has been broader 
and has not been confined to this narrow interpretation.67  The ICJ’s more 
recent examinations of state practice look at state declarations, UN 
documents, and treaties.68  This method of inquiry implies that proof of 
consistent state action is not always required for a finding of customary law.  
More recent decisions follow this line of reasoning and apply a broad 
definition of state practice that includes UN documents and participation in 
non-binding international conventions, such as the Geneva Conventions69 
                                           
60
  Id. art. 16. 
61
  Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary International Law: 
A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT’L L.. 757, 759-60 (2001). 
62
  Beth Stephens, Litigating Customary International Human Rights Norms, 25 GA. J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 191, 198 (1995/1996). 
63
  J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 449, 454-55 
(2000). 
64
  Guzman, supra note 52, at 149. 
65
  Theodor Meron, Revival of Customary Humanitarian Law, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 817, 817 (2005). 
66
  See North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den., F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 41-44 (Feb. 20). 
67
  Meron, supra note 65, at 819. 
68
  Id. at 820. 
69
  Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 113 (June 27). 
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and the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations,70 as evidence of 
customary law.  Thus, ICJ holdings allow for a broad and flexible analysis of 
state practice and belief, in which official statements and professed support 
of non-binding agreements qualify as evidence of customary international 
law. 
III. EVIDENCE EXISTS OF AN INTERNATIONAL ARMS EXPORT CONTROL 
NORM THAT MAY QUALIFY AS BINDING CUSTOMARY LAW 
The international instruments that set guidelines for arms-trading 
countries all specify that strict export license regulations are necessary in 
order to maintain global security and to prevent arms from accumulating in 
regions where they will have destabilizing or harmful effects.71  
Consistently, the central premise of these agreements is that nations that 
export arms must implement and enforce regulations that adequately control 
the transfer of arms.72 
This section synthesizes the major international instruments to 
formulate a strong and coherent norm requiring export controls on arms 
transfers, and shows that this norm has attained customary international law 
status.  The international requirement is supported both by state practice and 
by the belief of states in its legal force.73  The negotiation, ratification, and 
implementation of multilateral agreements by most arms-exporting states are 
evidence of state practice.  Official statements and UN votes qualify as legal 
belief.74  Assuming that this evidence is adequate to prove the existence of 
customary law, China is bound by it, even though it has not participated in 
its development to the same extent as other nations.  China has full 
knowledge of the norm, and officially supported it during its development 
instead of dissenting.75 
A. Consistent Evidence of the Customary Norm Is Found in Several 
Multilateral Agreements and UN Actions 
The UN, as well as groups of arms-exporting nations, have instituted 
programs and ratified multilateral agreements to establish norms that 
regulate international arms shipments.  These norms are contained in the 
                                           
70
  Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3, 21 (Feb. 14). 
71
  See infra Part III.A. 
72
  See infra Part III.A.4. 
73
  See infra Part III.B. 
74
  VILLIGER, supra note 29, at 51. 
75
  See infra Part III.B.3. 
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United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the 
Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (“UN 
PoA”),76 in the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for 
Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies (“Wassenaar 
Arrangement”),77 and in the Organization for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons (“OSCE 
Document”).78  These sources all focus on the need for a cooperative effort 
to ensure global stability by regulating export procedures in such a way that 
weapons are prevented from falling into the hands of regimes and 
individuals who commit human rights violations.79 
1. The UN PoA Provides International Arms Trade Standards for 
Member Nations to Implement 
The UN PoA is an agreement by member nations to implement 
actions on both a national and international level that endeavor to prevent 
and eliminate the illicit global trade in small arms and light weapons.80  It 
was formulated by a UN Conference in July 2001.81  The General Assembly 
officially adopted the PoA at the end of the same year and decided to review 
progress made by member states five years later.82 
The Preamble of the UN PoA recognizes that “the illicit trade in small 
arms . . . sustains conflicts [and] exacerbates violence”83 and that 
“[g]overnments bear the primary responsibility for preventing, combating 
and eradicating [this trade].”84  The member states resolve to take action to 
prevent and combat the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons 
(“SALW”).85  In Section II, the UN PoA presents actions that member states 
                                           
76
  Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light 
Weapons in All Its Aspects, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.192/15 (2001), available at 
http://disarmament.un.org/cab/poa.html [hereinafter UN PoA]. 
77
  Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and 
Technologies, Guidelines & Procedures, Including the Initial Elements (July 12, 1996), available at 
http://www.wassenaar.org/publicdocuments/Guidelines.doc [hereinafter Wassenaar Arrangement 
Guidelines]. 
78
  Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe [OSCE], OSCE Document on Small Arms 
and Light Weapons, OSCE Doc. FSC.JOUR/314 (Nov. 24, 2000), available at 
http://www.osce.org/documents/fsc/2000/11/1873_en.pdf [hereinafter OSCE Document]. 
79
  See infra Part.III.A.4. 
80
  UN PoA, supra note 76, sec. I, art. 22. 
81
  See id. sec. I, art. 1 (referencing Conference on the Illicit Traffic in Small Arms and Light 
Weapons in All Its Aspects meeting in New York, July 9-20, 2001). 
82
  G.A. Res. 56/24, art. V, U.N. Doc. A/Res/56/24 (Dec. 24, 2001). 
83
  UN PoA, supra note 76, sec. I, art. 5. 
84
  Id. sec. I, art. 13. 
85
  Id. sec. I, art. 22(a)-(e). 
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agree to take at the national, regional, and global levels.  Of particular 
interest to the topic at hand are Sections II(2), (11), and (12), which deal 
with regulation of arms production and the need for nations to implement 
comprehensive and effective export licensing regulations.  Section II(2) 
states that at the national level, member nations undertake to implement laws 
and administrative regulations that are sufficient to maintain control over the 
export of small arms.86  In Section II(11), states are expected to process 
export authorizations using strict regulations and procedures that prevent the 
illicit trade in weapons, consistent with their “existing responsibilities” 
under international law.87  Section II(12) reiterates the importance of state 
laws and regulations that control arms exports, and maintains that effective 
legal and enforcement measures are important components of this control.88 
2. The Wassenaar Arrangement Is a Multilateral Agreement Between 
Many of the Major Arms-Exporting States That Provides Standards 
for Export Controls  
The Wassenaar Arrangement is an international agreement that is 
intended to “complement and reinforce” existing export controls for arms, 
and for products and technologies that can be used as arms.89  Forty states 
are party to the agreement.90  Most of them are in Europe, but Korea, Japan, 
the United States, and South Africa are also signatories.91  The agreement 
was ratified in 199692 for the purpose of contributing to international 
security by preventing transfers of arms that result in destabilization of a 
country or region.93  The procedures require that states use “maximum 
restraint as a matter of national policy when considering applications for the 
export of arms . . . to all destinations where the risks are judged greatest, in 
particular to regions where conflict is occurring.”94 
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  Id. sec. II, art.2. 
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2007). 
93
  Wassenaar Arrangement Guidelines, supra note 77, sec. I, arts. 1-3. 
94
  Id. sec. IV, art. 2.  
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In 2002, the Wassenaar Arrangement was amended to include an 
appendix that deals specifically with the export of SALW.95  The Best 
Practice Guidelines for Exports of Small Arms and Light Weapons (“Best 
Practice Guidelines”), which was adopted by a plenary of member states, 
retains the themes set forth in the original agreement on conventional 
weapons, applying them specifically to SALW.96  The guidelines stipulate 
that states will take into account certain factors as they evaluate export 
license applications for SALW, including a clear risk that the arms will be 
used to prolong an existing armed conflict,97 endanger peace or contribute to 
regional instability,98 or “for the violation or suppression of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms.”99 
3. The OSCE Document on SALW Is Another Important Multilateral 
Agreement That Focuses on Export Controls 
The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, a regional 
security organization comprising fifty-six participating states,100 articulates 
the norms agreed upon by European arms-exporting states.  These states 
adopted an agreement on SALW in November of 2000.101  Although only 
European and North American states are party to the OSCE, these countries 
make up the majority of global arms producers and exporters.102  The OSCE 
Document contains many of the same themes as the Wassenaar 
Arrangement.  These include recognition of the destabilizing effect of arms 
transfers to conflict areas103 and the need to develop export control 
procedures that account for the situation in destination countries.104 
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The OSCE Document devotes considerable detail to export criteria 
and controls.105  The first factor to be considered when reviewing a license 
application is the recipient country’s record on human rights and 
fundamental freedoms.106  Licenses should be denied to recipients when 
there is a clear risk that they will use the arms to violate or suppress human 
rights,107 to prolong conflict or endanger peace,108 or to repress civilians.109  
The procedures must be sufficient to allow the state “to retain adequate 
control over such transfers.”110 
4. These Agreements Are Consistent and Articulate a Specific Norm 
The standards set forth in the multilateral agreements described above 
can be synthesized into a consistent norm.  They contain very similar 
objectives, themes, and requirements.  Although they are not identical, the 
recurring similarities and the overall consistency in these varied agreements 
support the argument that a strong, consistent, and specific norm has 
emerged. 
The central objective of the agreements is to increase global security 
and stability by establishing effective state control over the international 
transfer of small arms and conventional military equipment.111  All of the 
agreements encourage cooperation and the transfer of information between 
states, but place the responsibility on individual nations to implement 
internal policies and regulations that will stem the flow of arms to unstable 
regions or inhumane governments.112 
Export controls are a crucial tool addressed in each of the 
agreements.113  Specifically, member nations agree to exercise strict control 
over the transfer of arms across their borders.  License applications must be 
reviewed in light of the stability and human rights record of the recipient 
country.  Licenses should be denied when shipments are destined for areas 
where there is a high risk that the arms will be used to perpetuate conflict, 
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repression, or human rights abuses.  Simply enacting these regulations is not 
enough, however.  They also must be strictly enforced. 
Thus, a global norm can be articulated.  There is an expectation in the 
international community that arms-exporting states will regulate and enforce 
export-licensing requirements that restrict arms transfers to conflict areas 
and/or to human rights abusers.  The implementation of this norm begins on 
a national level, but must also be supported by international consistency and 
cooperation in order to maintain global security and stability and to protect 
human rights. 
B. If State Practice and Belief in the Legality of This Norm Constitute 
Customary International Law, It Is Binding on China 
The evidence demonstrates that international custom requires strict 
export controls on global arms transfers.  Participation in the UN PoA by 
member states shows both a belief in the objectives of the PoA, and an intent 
to implement its directives in practice.  Ratification of international 
instruments, such as the Wassenaar Arrangement, or regional instruments, 
such as the OSCE Document, provides evidence of state practice.  In 
addition, official policy statements and UN votes indicate a general belief 
among arms-exporting states that an enforceable norm has been established.  
China did not participate fully in the development of the customary norm, 
but may still be bound by it because it did not dissent as the potential law 
developed.114 
1. Participation in Multilateral Nonproliferation Agreements Is Evidence 
That General State Practice of Export Control Norms Exists 
The Wassenaar Arrangement fits squarely within the ICJ’s definition 
of state practice115 because it is an international instrument that was 
negotiated and ratified by a large number of states, including almost all of 
the world’s major arms exporters.116  Member states agree to uphold the 
goals of the Arrangement by conforming their national export policies to its 
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115
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directives. 117  The Arrangement stipulates that participating states should 
attempt to further its goals through their national policies in order to support 
global security.118 
The OSCE Document is a regional instrument that mirrors many of 
the provisions of the Wassenaar Arrangement.119  Although it cannot be used 
as evidence of global norms, it is a good indication of the norms accepted by 
European and North American states, regions that include most major arms 
exporters.  Like the Wassenaar Arrangement, it qualifies as state practice 
because of its ratification by signatory states.  Taken in their totality, these 
two agreements are representative of the customary norm that has emerged 
to regulate arms exports. 
Although recent in its development, state practice of the export 
control norm has been consistent for the past five to ten years.  A majority of 
states have voiced their belief in a standardized system for control of the 
arms trade through export licensing and monitoring.  In addition, a number 
of arms-exporting states reported to the UN that they have assessed and 
improved their arms laws and export regulations.120  The effectiveness of 
these policies is illustrated by the fact that most major exporters do not sell 
arms to Sudan.121 
It should be noted at this point that although the international 
instruments that describe the norms for arms exports have not been ratified 
by the majority of nations worldwide, they are still indicative of general 
global practice.  When a norm specially affects only certain states, the 
practices of those states are the most important in determining customary 
international law.122  The law that develops, however, binds all states.123  
Only a handful of nations manufacture and export most of the weapons that 
are traded in the international market,124 so it is the practices of these nations 
that must be examined most carefully.  Nearly all of these countries 
participate in the UN PoA, the Wassenaar Arrangement, and the OSCE 
Document.  China is a notable exception, as one of only two top arms-
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exporting countries125 that is not a signatory of the latter two multilateral 
agreements.  The practices of the majority of arms-exporting states provide 
sufficient evidence from which to draw an international norm. 
2. The Actions of the Member States Participating in the UN PoA Show 
State Practice and Belief in a Legal Norm for Export Controls 
The UN PoA, which urges member states to take responsibility for 
controlling the global flow of arms,126 also qualifies as evidence of 
customary international law.  General Assembly votes and statements by 
member countries are often classified as evidence of legal belief in a 
norm,127 and ICJ decisions indicate that they can even rise to the level of 
state practice.128  The PoA was established by passage of a UN resolution in 
2001, with the majority of member states voting in approval.129  This strong 
support for the PoA indicates a general belief among nations that states are 
to take action to control the arms trade.  The member states showed a unified 
front on the issue by agreeing to implement the specific provisions of the 
Programme in order to prevent the flow of arms to conflict regions.  
Although the PoA is a fairly recent development, this does not diminish its 
importance as evidence of customary law, since customary norms can 
develop in short periods of time as long as they are consistent among 
states.130 
The UN is collecting status updates on the implementation of the PoA 
through periodic conferences where nations report their activities and level 
of compliance.131  Many nations have made progress in the first five years of 
the PoA.  The majority of UN member nations, 137 out of 192 countries, 
have submitted reports on their progress.132  Over eighty percent of reporting 
nations have addressed their national export and transfer controls in response 
to the PoA’s recommendations.133  Actual implementation of PoA directives 
goes beyond mere statements, and qualifies as strong evidence of state 
practice, as well as a general belief that the custom is legally required. 
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3. China’s Policy Statements and Legislative Actions Provide Evidence 
of Its Knowledge of and Belief in the International Custom, While 
There Is No Indication of Official Dissent 
China never officially dissented to the export control norm.  In fact, 
China explicitly declared its support for the UN PoA.  In a statement to the 
2006 UN Conference to Review Progress Made in the Implementation of the 
Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in 
Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, the Chinese Ambassador 
to the UN stated that China actively participates in the Programme’s 
objectives.134  He claimed that China has established “relatively 
comprehensive domestic legislation," and that its export controls “match 
international practices, including the licensing system for SALW export.”135  
He also promised that “China will continue to actively participate in the PoA 
review process in a constructive manner and is ready to exchange experience 
and promote cooperation with other parties during the process, in a joint 
effort to move forward the multilateral process of combating the illicit trade 
in SALW.”136 
In addition to statements made to the UN, an internal Chinese policy 
directive on arms control affirms that “China is committed to properly 
addressing humanitarian issues in the arms control field”137 and explained 
that in order to do so, the government will base its policies on the goal of 
maintaining national security and global stability.138  These official 
statements show a lack of dissent on China’s part, because it has full 
knowledge of the international norms and maintains that its policy is to 
comply with them.  Although statements by an individual nation in support 
of a norm do not make it binding, these statements do lead to the inference 
that China recognizes the binding nature of the proposed customary law. 
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IV. CHINA’S EXPORT CONTROL LAWS ALLOW ARMS SHIPMENTS TO SUDAN 
AND VIOLATE A POTENTIALLY BINDING CUSTOMARY NORM 
China’s export controls do not meet the customary international 
standard as set forth in the UN PoA and the Wassenaar and OSCE 
agreements.  The customary norm that requires strict export controls on arms 
shipments to conflict areas may now have the force of international law, for 
it is sufficiently supported by evidence of state practice and belief.139  
China’s licensing regulations for arms exports are not adequate under this 
international standard.  Although some of the language in China’s export 
regulations contains similarities to the Wassenaar Arrangement language, 
there are significant gaps between Chinese practices and international 
standards.140  The enacted export regulations are too vague and do not 
restrict licenses in the manner required by international law.  In addition, 
China has failed to adequately implement both its own legal standards and 
the more stringent international standards. 
A. China’s Export Laws Give Broad Discretion to License Administrators 
and Contain Limited Restrictions Regarding Destination Countries 
China’s export regulations are found in the Regulations of the 
People’s Republic of China ("PRC") on Administration of Arms Export.141  
Article 4 explicitly asserts that the state has control over the management of 
arms exports, the power to prevent shipments that would be damaging to 
security, and the responsibility to ensure the lawful exercise of export 
controls.142  Article 5 contains three principles that determine whether an 
arms shipment is appropriate:  1) the arms should be useful to the self-
defense capability of the recipient country, 2) they should not threaten 
regional or international peace and stability, and 3) the exports should not 
interfere with the internal affairs of the recipient country.143  Article 13 
introduces the license system that applies these requirements.144  Proposals 
for arms exports must be examined and approved according to the 
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regulations, and the export of arms is dependent on obtaining a formal 
license.145 
These principles are vague and internally contradictory.  In Article 5, 
although subsection (2) requires that licensing authorities consider the 
stability of the recipient region, it does not explicitly state that a finding of 
instability should result in denial of the application.  It is also unclear how 
subsection (3), which advocates a policy of non-interference in internal 
affairs, might apply when there is internal conflict and instability.  Because 
the regulations do not give explicit direction for how the general principles 
in Article 5 are to be applied when evaluating an export license application, 
they give a great deal of discretion to individual license administrators.  This 
means that the state is not in control of the process, despite the statement to 
the contrary in Article 4. 
The Chinese regulations do not require denial of a license application 
even when there is a risk that the arms will be used to suppress fundamental 
freedoms or repress human rights.146  Article 5(2) of the Chinese law 
addresses stability and security concerns, but makes no mention of human 
rights.147  In fact, Section (3), which advocates a policy of non-interference 
in the internal affairs of the destination country,148 leaves little room for 
analysis of a recipient government’s human rights record. 
B. China’s Failure to Control Its Arms Exports to Sudan Through 
Adequate Controls and Licensing Regulations Is a Possible Violation 
of Customary International Law 
China is violating international arms control norms by employing 
export regulations that are vague and incomplete by international standards.  
The prospective customary law described earlier in this Comment requires 
that arms-exporting states adequately control the shipments that leave their 
borders through strict export regulations.149  Chinese regulations fall short of 
this standard because they allow for broad discretion and they lack specific 
standards.  In addition, international custom requires that an exporting state 
prevent arms from being shipped to regions characterized by instability and 
human rights violations.150  China’s regulations do not explicitly control for 
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human rights violations in destination countries, and thereby fail to meet this 
requirement. 
China’s recurring approvals of arms shipments to Sudan confirm the 
weaknesses of the existing regulations.  China is a primary international 
supplier of small arms and military equipment to Sudan.151  In Sudan, 
government forces are committing crimes against humanity,152 using 
weapons obtained from China.  The fact that such large-scale arms 
shipments have made their way through China’s export licensing system 
despite the human rights situation in Darfur indicates that the system does 
not meet the international standard.153 
V. THE ILC ARTICLES OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY HOLD STATES 
RESPONSIBLE FOR COMMITTING OR ASSISTING IN WRONGFUL ACTS 
The Draft Articles on State Responsibility for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts (“Draft Articles on State Responsibility”),154 adopted in 2001 
by the International Law Commission (“ILC”), define how states can be held 
responsible for their international obligations.155  Articles 1-3 address the 
general principles of state responsibility for internationally wrongful acts.  
Articles 4-11 discuss the attribution of conduct to a state.  And Articles 16-
19 define the responsibility of a state that is complicit with another state in 
wrongful actions. 
There are two elements to the definition of an internationally wrongful 
act.  That act must be attributable to the state, and it must constitute “a 
breach of an international obligation.”156  The wrongful act can be either an 
action or a failure to act when there is a duty to do so.157  Article 3 stipulates 
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that international law, not internal law, governs the characterization of 
internationally wrongful acts.158 
Actions of a state are conducted by “organs” of the state.159  This term 
covers any individual or entity that carries out governmental functions of the 
state, whether legislative, executive, judicial, or regulatory,160 as long as they 
are acting within their official capacity.161  If a person or entity is not an 
“organ” of the state, but has been empowered to exercise governmental 
authority, those actions are also attributable to the state.162 
Finally, even the conduct of those without any governmental authority 
can be attributed to the state if they are acting under the control or 
instruction of the state.  In Nicaragua v. United States, the ICJ determined 
that the United States did not have “effective control” over the activities of 
the Nicaraguan paramilitary forces accused of international crimes.163  
Because the United States was not giving them specific orders, it was not 
found liable for the wrongful acts they committed, despite its financial 
support of their activities.164  However, in a more recent case from the 
International Criminal Tribunal on Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, 
the court diverged from the Nicaragua reasoning and used an “overall 
control” test to attribute the conduct of paramilitary actors to the state.165  
This definition of state control requires that the state finance and equip the 
militia, as well as generally coordinate its military aims, but does not require 
that direct orders be issued specifically for the wrongful conduct.166 
Article 16 of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility provides that a 
second state can be held responsible for aiding or assisting the first state in 
the internationally wrongful act.167  This rule has given rise to the concept 
that complicity rather than direct control creates responsibility for an 
internationally wrongful act.168  This Article is not invoked often, and there 
are no known cases of an international court holding a state responsible 
under Article 16 for its complicity in another state’s internationally wrongful 
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act.  The ICJ addressed the issue of transnational state responsibility in its 
Nicaragua v. United States decision but did not explicitly provide for 
complicity as a violation of state responsibility.169  However, the concept that 
complicity is a violation of international law has been applied in 
international relations on several occasions.170 
Article 16 requires that the state providing assistance know of the 
circumstances of the wrongful act and that the act would still be wrongful 
under international law if it were committed by the assisting state, rather 
than the primary state.171  It is unclear whether the rule requires intent on the 
part of the complicit state to assist in wrongdoing, or whether an action that 
results in furthering the wrongdoing, with or without intent, is sufficient.172 
VI. CHINA IS VIOLATING THE ARTICLES OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY BY 
PROVIDING AID AND ASSISTANCE TO SUDAN IN THE FORM OF WEAPONS 
The internationally wrongful acts committed in Darfur are attributable 
to Sudan.  It has taken inadequate action to prevent human rights violations 
committed by the military as an organ of the state, or non-governmental 
forces within its control such as the Janjaweed militias.173  China is 
providing aid and assistance to Sudan by allowing the flow of arms from 
China to Sudan to continue, with the knowledge that the weapons are likely 
going into the hands of those committing the abuses.174  This is a violation of 
international law under the Draft Articles on State Responsibility. 
A. Sudan’s Actions in Darfur Are Internationally Wrongful Acts 
Under international law, the actions of the Sudanese military and the 
Janjaweed militia in Darfur are wrongful acts.  The ILC Articles do not 
provide an enumerated list of wrongful actions, but the ICJ specified on 
more than one occasion that satisfying the two elements of Article 2 
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establishes legal responsibility for state action.175  The evidence must show 
that the atrocities in Darfur are:  1) attributable to Sudan and 2) a breach of 
responsibility under international human rights law.  According to the report 
prepared by the UN International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, 
Sudanese government forces and Janjaweed militia are responsible for 
“serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law 
amounting to crimes under international law.”176  Specifically, these crimes 
include killing of civilians, destruction of villages, torture, rape, and forced 
disappearances,177 acts which all fall into accepted categories of human 
rights violations under international law.178 
Actions carried out by organs of the state such as government military 
forces are attributable to the state.179  After exhaustive research, the UN 
Commission of Inquiry concluded that Sudanese military forces have been 
committing violent acts against civilians in Darfur.180  Even acts committed 
by non-governmental militia groups can be attributed to Sudan, as long as 
they were acting under the control or instruction of the government.181  This 
situation is analogous to the type of control attributed to the Yugoslavian 
government in the Tadic case.182  In that case, the militia groups that 
committed crimes against humanity were financed, armed, and organized by 
Yugoslavia.183  The conclusions of the UN Commission of Inquiry show that 
the Sudanese government exercised this same level of overall control.184 
Finally, not only did the Sudanese government provide weapons and 
air support for the militia attacks, but it failed to protect innocent civilians 
within its borders from ongoing and repetitive attacks.185  Its inadequate 
measures in response to the violence in Darfur created a “climate of almost 
total impunity for human rights violations.”186  As noted above, states can be 
held liable for omissions as well as actions.187 
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B. China’s Provision of Arms to Sudan Qualifies as “Aiding and 
Assisting” in an Internationally Wrongful Act 
China is complicit in the wrongful acts committed by the Sudanese 
forces because it provided aid and assistance in the form of arms shipments, 
with full knowledge that the weapons would likely be used to commit 
unlawful human rights abuses.  As a primary supplier of military equipment 
to Sudan,188 China’s arms shipments assist Sudan in its military endeavors 
by arming its forces.  As described above, the weapons are being used to 
commit human rights violations by military organs of the state and militias 
which are under the overall control of the state.  Chinese weapons are crucial 
to the equation, and China can be held responsible for its assistance. 
China’s actions fall within the requirements of Article 16 of the Draft 
Articles on State Responsibility.189  China’s knowledge of the wrongful acts 
committed in Darfur can be assumed, since there is ample published 
evidence of the crimes.  The UN Commission’s report is the most 
authoritative record of the situation.190  In addition, human rights 
organizations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have 
published comprehensive reports detailing the crimes as reported by local 
observers.191  Finally, media coverage and political discussion of the issue 
are extensive.192  The criminal nature of Sudan’s actions satisfy the second 
prong of Article 16.193  These acts would still be wrongful under 
international law if committed by any other state, including China. 
VII. CHINA SHOULD AMEND ITS EXPORT REGULATIONS TO CONFORM WITH 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HALT SHIPMENTS OF ARMS TO SUDAN 
Currently, China could be held responsible for violations of 
international law on more than one level.  International sanctions are not 
automatic, and would depend on a suit being brought before the ICJ or in a 
national court under that nation’s laws,194 but China should take measures to 
avoid this possibility.  Although China has a strong national interest in 
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maintaining positive relations with its oil suppliers, especially Sudan, it also 
should have a strong interest in protecting human rights and fundamental 
freedoms.  These are valuable interests in their own right, but also can have 
a significant influence on China’s international political standing.  China’s 
primary policy objective should be to support global security and stability, 
and it should not be willing to sacrifice human rights protections in 
exchange for fuel contracts. 
A. China Should Revise and Clarify Its Export Regulations in 
Accordance with International Customary Norms 
First, China needs to make changes to its regulation of exports and its 
oversight of export licensing.  If arms shipments are more heavily regulated 
at the outset of the transfer process, they are much less likely to make their 
way to conflict areas such as Sudan, where human rights abuses are rampant.  
Rather than giving broad discretion to customs officials to grant licenses, the 
state should revise its license regulations according to international law and 
ensure that they are strictly enforced.  This change would comport with the 
principles of the UN PoA, Sections II(2) and II(11), which recommend 
increased state oversight of arms exports.  The change would also limit the 
discretion of officials to give licenses to arms shipments intended for 
conflict areas.  Increasing the regulation of the export licensing process 
could also have the beneficial result of decreasing the number of bribes 
offered and accepted. 
Second, Article 5 of the Regulations of the PRC on the Administration 
of Arms Exports should be amended.  The three licensing principles that it 
contains, particularly Subsections (1) and (3), do not conform with 
international standards.195  Subsection (1), which requires that arms 
shipments be useful to a country’s self-defense, seems unnecessary and is 
not a primary concern in any of the international instruments that govern 
export norms.  Subsection (3), which advocates a policy of non-interference, 
is potentially contradictory to international custom, which requires that 
exporting countries analyze the internal situation in the recipient country.196  
Subsection (2), which stipulates the need to support global and regional 
security, should remain in place and be supplemented by additional criteria.  
The Wassenaar Arrangement is a good source for the principles that should 
be included in China’s potential revision of its export controls.197  These 
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criteria would decline licenses for arms shipments likely to prolong armed 
conflict, endanger stability, or violate human rights and suppress 
fundamental freedoms.198 
Third, to correct the vagueness and inconsistencies in its current 
licensing regulations, China could implement the Wassenaar “Elements for 
Objective Analysis and Advice Concerning Potentially Destabilising 
Accumulations of Conventional Weapons.”199  This document, which is an 
amendment to the original agreement establishing the Wassenaar 
Arrangement, provides an extensive list of questions to consider when 
deciding if a potential recipient of arms poses a high risk for instability or 
repression.200  Based on these criteria, the state could maintain an updated 
list of countries where conflict and instability produce a high danger that 
arms will be used to commit human rights violations.  The implementation 
of this document would likely provide a human rights component to license 
approvals and would address some the vagueness problems in the current 
statute. 
B. China Needs to Restrict Further Arms Shipments to Sudan 
In addition to examining and revising its current export control 
regulations, China needs to immediately restrict the indiscriminate sale of 
arms to Sudan.  China’s policy of non-interference in countries it trades with 
is putting China at risk of being found complicit to the crimes against 
humanity committed in Darfur.201  China’s failure to acknowledge the human 
rights situation in Sudan is short-sighted.  Not only does it put China in a 
precarious political position internationally, but it contributes to continued 
instability in Sudan.  As a major investor in Sudan’s oil wealth, China should 
be concerned about the stability of the country and should not contribute to 
continued conflict there by providing weapons. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The global arms trade is a vital issue, and the international community 
has actively developed norms over the past decade to regulate this trade.  
The consistency and binding nature of these norms, as evidenced by general 
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state usage and belief, is sufficient to make a case for the existence of a 
customary international law regarding arms exports.  Specifically, this law 
requires that individual states implement and enforce comprehensive and 
specific export regulations on arms shipments.  These regulations are 
intended to protect global security and human freedoms by preventing 
shipments to high risk areas. 
China’s shipment of arms to Sudan violates this international law.  
China’s export regulations are too vague, do not specifically bar shipments 
to human rights violators, and are not adequately enforced.  In addition, 
China is complicit in the humanitarian crimes being committed by Sudanese 
forces in Darfur.  By supplying arms to a violent regime in an unstable 
region, with the full knowledge that the arms will likely be used in crimes 
against humanity, China is aiding and assisting Sudan in the commission of 
an internationally wrongful act. 
Despite the financial value of China’s oil investments in Sudan, China 
cannot afford to turn a blind eye to the severe human rights abuses in Darfur.  
It should immediately halt further shipments of arms to Sudan, in order to 
avoid complicity in the human rights crisis there.  China should also 
reevaluate its foreign policy in this area, and focus on the long-term goal of 
global security and stability, rather than the short-term goal of obtaining 
cheap fuel.  To this end, China should reform its export control regulations 
so that the state adequately manages the arms shipments leaving its borders, 
specifically by placing restrictions on licenses given to exports destined for 
conflict areas or inhumane regimes. 
